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Abstract 
Dynamic capitalist economies are characterised by relentless innovation and novelty and 
hence exhibit an indeterminacy that cannot be reduced to measurable risk. How then do 
economic actors form expectations and decide how to act despite this uncertainty? This pa­
per focuses on the role played by imaginaries, narratives, and calculative technologies, and 
argues that the market impact of shared calculation devices, social narratives, and contin­
gent imaginaries underlines the rationale for a new form of ‘narrative economics’ and a the­
ory of fictional (rather than rational) expectations. When expectations cannot be anchored 
in objective probability functions, the future belongs to those with the market, political, or 
rhetorical power to make their models or stories count. The paper also explores the dangers 
of analytical monocultures and the discourse of best practice in conditions of uncertainty, 
and considers the link between uncertainty and some aspects of populism.
Keywords: calculation, fictional expectations, future, imaginaries, innovation, narrative 
economics, uncertainty
Zusammenfassung
Kapitalistische Ökonomien sind durch unablässige Neuerung gekennzeichnet. Innovatio­
nen zeigen eine Unbestimmtheit, die nicht auf meßbares Risiko reduziert werden kann. 
Wie bilden Akteure in der Wirtschaft Erwartungen und legen ihre Handlungen im An­
gesicht dieser Ungewissheit fest? Der Beitrag befasst sich mit der Rolle von Vorstellungen, 
Narrativen und kalkulativen Techniken in der Wirtschaft und zeigt, dass die Bedeutung 
verwendeter kalkulativer Instrumente, sozial geteilter Narrative und kontingenter Vorstel­
lungen eine neue Form „narrativer Wirtschaftswissenschaft“ und einer Theorie fiktiona­
ler (anstelle von rationalen) Erwartungen notwendig macht. Wenn Erwartungen nicht in 
objektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktionen verankert werden können, gehört die Zukunft 
denjenigen, die über die marktliche, politische oder rhetorische Macht verfügen, ihren Er­
zählungen Geltung zu verschaffen. Der Beitrag befasst sich im letzten Teil mit den Gefahren 
analytischer Monokulturen und dem Diskurs zu „best practices“ in durch Ungewissheit ge­
kennzeichneten Situationen und leitet daraus einige Schlussfolgerungen für das Verständ­
nis von Populismus ab.
Schlagwörter: fiktionale Erwartungen, Innovation, Kalkulation, narrative Wirtschaftswissen­
schaften, Ungewissheit, Vorstellungen, Zukunft
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Uncertain Futures: Imaginaries, Narratives, and Calculative 
Technologies
It is a great pleasure to speak at the Harvard Kennedy School. Our joint lecture is the 
product of an enjoyable collaboration with each other – and indeed with the other con-
tributors to our new book, Uncertain Futures.1 
When Professor Sheila Jasanoff invited us to speak in this Science and Democracy series, 
she challenged us to focus on implications of our argument for the science of econom-
ics and for politics. Uncertain Futures is an interdisciplinary project that examines how 
economic actors combine imaginaries and narratives with calculative technologies to 
structure their expectations and decisions in conditions of uncertainty. Our explora-
tion of how entrepreneurs and policymakers in practice deal with the uncertainty at 
the heart of contemporary capitalism has a number of implications for the science of 
economics. In particular, the importance of fictional expectations – of imaginaries and 
narratives – implies the need to analyse the contingent interpretations that economic 
actors place on their uncertain predicament. At the same time, the indeterminacy of the 
future, and the performative impact of stories and calculative technologies in shaping 
that future, has implications for the nature of political power and for policy practice. In 
a nutshell, we argue that power belongs to those with the market, political, or rhetorical 
strength to make their models or narratives count; and, since no calculative technology 
can accurately predict uncertain futures, policymakers need to use a plurality of diverse 
models to help diagnose emerging patterns. We come back to these points later. 
We are speaking in the home of the co-production2 school of Science and Technology 
Studies, and much that we say in this lecture about the role of social imaginaries in 
economics is relevant to this approach. The co-production of scientific knowledge and 
This is an edited and expanded version of the transcript of a joint lecture given in the Science and 
Democracy Lecture Series at Harvard Kennedy School on October 23, 2019. Drawing on arguments 
from our recently published edited volume Uncertain Futures: Imaginaries, Narratives, and Calculation 
in the Economy (Oxford University Press, 2018), it considers implications for the science of economics 
and for policy and politics. The lecture was given at the kind invitation of Professor Sheila Jasanoff.
1 Jens Beckert and Richard Bronk, eds., Uncertain Futures: Imaginaries, Narratives, and Calcula-
tion in the Economy (Oxford University Press, 2018). The lecture and edited volume are the 
products of a research collaboration which started with a MaxPo-sponsored conference at the 
Institut d’études avancées de Paris in April 2016. This collaboration in turn draws on earlier 
books: Richard Bronk, The Romantic Economist: Imagination in Economics (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009); and Jens Beckert, Imagined Futures: Fictional Expectations and Capitalist 
Dynamics (Harvard University Press, 2016). 
2 For a discussion of the ‘co-production’ of science and social order, see Jasanoff (2004).
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social structures has a different quality in the case of economics than in, say, astronomy 
or biology: in all three cases, we are dealing with what Adam Smith ([1795] 1980) called 
‘inventions of the imagination’3 – scientific systems conjured up to make sense of the 
manifold chaos of brute reality in ways that are intimately bound up with socially em-
bedded theoretical frames. But where economics (like all social science) differs from 
physical sciences is that it engages with a reality that is pre-interpreted by the actors 
enacting it. What is more, in modelling or forecasting an indeterminate future yet to 
be created by how social actors expect, model, or will it to be, the calculative devices 
of economics help shape the future. Increasingly, calculative technologies – like other 
technologies – are integral components of the social and market order, shaping and 
shaped by that order. It is in this deep sense that we can say that economic knowledge 
is ‘co-produced’ with social reality. Human imagination pervades both the science of 
economics and its socio-economic subject matter, enabling both to be constantly re-
fashioned and reconceived in novel and mutually constitutive ways. 
But let us return to Uncertain Futures. When we chose the book’s title in early 2016, it 
seemed quite brave, given the relative lack of interest in ‘Knightian’ or radical uncer-
tainty4 within the economics profession. Now – after the Brexit vote, Trump’s trade 
wars, and the populist challenge to neo-liberalism – the title may seem a rather ob-
vious attempt to focus on the current turmoil facing Western political economies. In 
truth, though, our argument comes from many years of research we have undertaken 
to understand the role of imaginaries and narratives in driving the economy and the 
uncertainty they imply; and we explicitly build on the ideas of economic thinkers of 
the mid-twentieth century – Joseph Schumpeter, Frank Knight, John Maynard Keynes, 
Friedrich Hayek, and George Shackle – who wrote in the shadow of two world wars and 
the Great Depression. 
Uncertain Futures draws on research in economic sociology, economics, history, an-
thropology, and psychology. While we provide the theoretical framework in the open-
ing chapter, the rest of the book includes empirical case studies by thirteen authors 
including Robert Boyer, David Tuckett, Jenny Andersson, Andrew Haldane, Douglas 
Holmes, and Elena Esposito. They demonstrate how grand narratives, central bank 
forward guidance, calculative technologies, business plans, visions of the technologi-
cal future, and new era stories shape expectations, influence behaviour, and become 
instruments of power.
In a nutshell, Uncertain Futures considers how economic actors visualise the future and 
decide how to act in conditions of radical uncertainty. We start from the premise that 
3 Smith ([1795] 1980) argued that scientific systems are ‘inventions of the imagination, to con-
nect together the otherwise disjointed and discordant phenomena of nature’ – see discussion in 
Bronk (2009, 62) and Fleischacker (2004, 21).
4 For a discussion of Frank Knight’s famous distinction between radical ‘uncertainty’ and mea-
surable ‘risk’, see Knight (1921). 
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dynamic capitalist economies are characterised by relentless innovation and novelty 
and hence exhibit an indeterminacy that cannot be reduced to measurable risk. In these 
circumstances, you can neither calculate the optimal course of action nor internalise 
the correct model of the economy – as standard rational expectations theory assumes. 
To put it simply, when the world is uncertain, you cannot know what the best model will 
be, and the past may not be a good guide to the future. The organising question for us 
is then: How do you form expectations and decide how to act despite this uncertainty? 
Our headline answer is that, in conditions of uncertainty, economic actors combine cal-
culation with imaginaries and narratives to form ‘fictional’ expectations that coordinate 
action, express power, and provide the confidence to act. Indeed, we argue that the mar-
ket impact of shared calculation devices, social narratives, and contingent imaginaries 
underlines the need for a new form of ‘narrative economics’ and a theory of fictional 
(rather than rational) expectations. This approach takes seriously the social construc-
tion and contingency of expectations and therefore market prices; and it recognises that, 
in cases where expectations cannot be anchored in objective probability functions, the 
imaginaries and narratives that guide our behaviour are partly a function of market or 
political power.
1 Fictional expectations and other working fictions
To avoid misunderstanding at the outset: when we talk about ‘fictional expectations’ we 
do not mean that economic agents engage in wilful fantasies instead of trying to act in 
their best interests. What we allude to instead is that, in conditions of radical uncer-
tainty, agents act at the boundary between current reality and what may yet happen. 
This implies that statements regarding uncertain futures – and how to reach or avoid 
such futures – necessarily entail assumptions that cannot be based solely on observable 
truths. Intentionally rational decisions must be based on how we imagine the future – 
on the kind of “as-if” thinking central to fictional texts.
The fictional element envisaged here is complementary to – and more radical than – the 
constructive and contingent fictions that Hans Vaihinger (1924) and others (working 
in the Kantian tradition) argue are necessarily a feature of any attempt to make sense of 
brute reality. We all act as if the world-as-it-really-is resembles the world-as-it-appears-
to-us when constructed according to contingent categories and linguistic frames our 
minds supply. As the poet William Wordsworth put it: ‘In weakness we create distinc-
tions, then / Believe that all our puny boundaries are things / Which we perceive and 
not which we have made.’5 In other words, all rational analysis – indeed all perception 
5 Wordsworth, William, ‘Fragment’, dated by E. de Selincourt to 1798–1800. Reproduced and 
discussed in Bronk (2009, 285).
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– is to some extent fictional in the sense of being a necessarily contingent construction 
of reality-as-it-appears-to-us. 
To this primary element of constructive fiction in all human understanding of the world, 
we can add a second – one that builds on our earlier observation that, when you try 
to make sense of societies and economies, you are interpreting a social reality that is 
pre-interpreted by the actors enacting it. This means that – as economic actor or social 
scientist – you must interpret the fictional constructions that others place on their pre-
dicament because these contingent fictions structure social reality by influencing be-
haviour. Social analysis is thereby a sort of reflexive fiction – a fictional narrative about 
guiding fictions. 
To these necessary and reflexive types of working fictions by which we all live our lives, 
we add a third. When dealing with the indeterminate and uncertain future, our expecta-
tions are fictional in a more radical sense: it is not just that – epistemologically speaking 
– we are always deprived of unmediated access both to the world-as-it-really-is and to 
the contingent and socially performative interpretations of others; it is that in an onto-
logical sense there is no socio-economic future-as-it-really-will-be ‘out there’ ahead of 
its creation by how we and others imagine and will it to be. Our fictional expectations 
can have no anchor in – or uniquely rational relation to – underlying future reality for 
the simple reason that the future does not yet exist. We will come back to this point later. 
2 Radical uncertainty and the implications for economics
Let us first return to our central premise: that uncertainty – radical uncertainty – is a 
core feature of modern economies. Given the ubiquity in modern capitalism of calcula-
tive technologies dedicated to forecasting and planning economic futures and measur-
ing the risks faced, it might seem strange to insist that the future is open and indetermi-
nate. But, as an individual or firm, you often imagine and plan for an array of possible 
futures and choose between a number of options without fully predictable outcomes. 
And this freedom to invent new possibilities comes in the context of an economic sys-
tem that is continually generating novelty. It was Schumpeter ([1943] 1976, 84) who 
first pointed out that the competition that counts comes from ‘the new commodity, the 
new technology … the new type of organization’. The consequent ‘process of industrial 
mutation’, he argued, ‘incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within’; 
and this ‘process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism’ (ibid., 
83). In other words, the innovations that upset previously stable regularities are not oc-
casional external shocks (as most standard economics assumes); instead they lie at the 
heart of market systems.
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Novel technologies and organisations are not the only source of indeterminacy in the 
economy. Global financial markets are highly interdependent networks with all the 
classic properties of complex adaptive systems: this means that instead of responding to 
shocks by returning to some pre-ordained equilibrium, they frequently display thresh-
old effects and increasing returns, so that small changes in initial conditions snowball 
into radically new outcomes and long periods of disequilibrium.6 What is more, in the 
neo-liberal policy paradigm, markets are subject to a continual process of deregulation 
and policy reform – freeing them from institutional constraints that previously chan-
nelled ‘the sources of contingency’ (Offe 1998, 682), and contributing to what Zygmunt 
Bauman (2000) memorably dubbed ‘liquid modernity’. Finally, as Karl Polanyi ([1944] 
1957) observed, attempts to sustain market capitalism frequently lead to counter-move-
ments of social and political protest; and the Brexit vote and the election of Trump serve 
to remind us how unpredictable and far-reaching the political, social, and economic 
crises associated with these counter-movements can become.
So, what are the implications of this indeterminacy at the heart of modern capitalism? 
One is that the future cannot be understood as a statistical shadow of the past: you can-
not simply project past regularities into the future and use statistics based on past data 
to provide probabilistic predictions. Nor can the past tell you what the correct model 
of the indeterminate future will be. For example, many models that appeared to hold 
for monetary policy before the policy innovation of quantitative easing do not work 
now. What is more, the first-order uncertainty implied by any particular innovation is 
compounded by uncertainty about the second-order creative reactions and contingent 
interpretations of others. Not only are you unable to know what the direct impact of an 
innovative move will be, you also cannot know how others will react. Your expectations 
and your expectations of the expectations of others cannot be anchored in an agreed 
future because, as Shackle ([1972] 1992, 3) put it, ‘What does not yet exist cannot now 
be known.’ In such circumstances, you can neither calculate the optimal outcome nor 
predict the future. Your expectations are indeterminate.
Part of the motivation for our project was that standard economics fails to explain how 
expectations are formed and decisions made when this sort of uncertainty prevails. It 
largely ignores the radical uncertainty caused when innovation – the imagining of new 
options – breaks the predicable links between the past and the future; or it conflates such 
uncertainty with what Knight (1921) called measurable ‘risk’. In other words, standard 
economics assumes that the future is always a statistical shadow of the past and – except 
for random events – can be predicted in probability terms with the help of sufficient data. 
Indeed, it generally assumes that – once you have allowed for the predictable distortions 
of framing biases and information asymmetries – economic agents will converge on ra-
tional expectations: they will internalise the correct model of the economy, and avoid 
systematic errors in forecasting, because they would otherwise lose out in competitive 
markets to those with more rational expectations. 
6 See the discussion in Arthur (2015) and Haldane (2018).
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These assumptions may be valid in a world of stable parameters. But our point is that 
in conditions of radical uncertainty – where the set of possible states of the world is 
unknowable – you have no choice but to rely on imaginaries and narratives about the 
future. Think of tech start-ups whose value is sustained by little else but narratives of 
future profits. Such contingent imaginaries serve two purposes: they structure expecta-
tions; and they reshape the future by motivating behaviour. In this way, imagination is 
a root cause of novelty and uncertainty, as well as our best tool for coping with both. 
Our focus on this role of contingent narratives and imaginaries goes beyond the critique 
of standard economics seen in behavioural economics. Behavioural economists argue 
that, faced with ambiguity, you resort to predictable heuristics and cognitive frames to 
make decisions. While this is certainly true on many occasions, it provides only a par-
tial explanation of decision-making. If you think of the innovative ventures central to 
capitalist dynamics over the last 200 years, they would be poorly explained by cognitive 
regularities. Rather, their hallmark was that entrepreneurs, investors, and consumers 
were attracted by imagined futures that were novel. 
Our focus on imaginaries and contingent narratives bears more similarity to the ‘nar-
rative economics’ that Robert Shiller (2019) outlines in his new book of the same name. 
But, while Shiller takes seriously the role of narratives in explaining key changes in the 
economy, his theoretical focus is largely on the role of epidemiology models in captur-
ing the contagion dynamics underlying the diffusion of influential stories. By contrast, 
our theoretical focus is on how uncertainty can explain why and under what conditions 
narratives become important. 
3 Expectations in conditions of uncertainty
But let us return to how we characterise the nature of expectations in conditions of un-
certainty. We argue that you should see expectations as fictional rather than rational. 
When the future is not already ‘given’; when it cannot be assumed to exist as an objective 
shadow of the past; when there is no fixed anchor in underlying reality for expectations 
because the future does not yet exist and cannot now be known, then your expectations 
must be fictional in the sense of going beyond observable truths. What is more, in con-
ditions of uncertainty, your expectations tend to be fluid and experimental and involve 
imaginative play with different images of the possible future – as John Dewey ([1922] 
1957) has explained. Crucially, your expectations do not normally take the form of prob-
ability forecasts; rather, they adopt a narrative structure and rely on the rhetorical power 
of language for the degree of conviction they excite. 
Fictional expectations differ from literary fictions, of course, in their impact and in the 
critical scrutiny to which they are exposed: if they appear desirable and feasible, they 
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inspire you to act in ways designed to bring about that imagined future; if, on the other 
hand, they fill you with anxiety or disgust, they incite action designed to foil the imag-
ined future. But the point remains that your expectations are contingent products of 
how you happen to imagine the future. 
Such imaginaries are not entirely individually formed. Like Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun 
Kim’s notion of sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim 2013), fictional expecta-
tions are the product of social narratives and historically anchored public images conjured 
up by powerful opinion-formers. As a result, market prices and behaviour reflect the con-
tingent and socially constructed visions that influence decisions. This explains why, as 
Keynes (1936) observed, market traders are highly attentive to dominant narratives.
Now this is all very well you may say; but do we not see traders, investors, and policy-
makers ever more reliant on mathematical models and algorithms that appear to cal-
culate the very macroeconomic futures we insist are radically uncertain? How is such 
calculation being used if the expectations they give rise to are fictional? It is certainly 
true that fictional expectations make explicit use of calculative technologies. The future 
we imagine is shaped by models and predictive instruments. Indeed, these technolo-
gies should be seen as ‘instruments of the imagination’ (Beckert 2016). Imaginaries, as 
Jasanoff (2015, 5) puts it, are ‘intimately linked to science and technology’. 
Several chapters in our book analyse how calculative devices organise and subject to 
rigorous analysis visions of the future that have their origin in imaginaries, or make vis-
ible possible futures that would otherwise not have been imagined: the business plan is 
used to demonstrate the feasibility of capturing an imagined new market in the light of 
known constraints (Giraudeau 2018); and the discounted cash flow model helps agents 
experimentally visualise and value options they might not otherwise have articulated 
(Doganova 2018). Likewise, a variety of forecasting technologies are used as diagnostic 
tools for teasing out systematic regularities and spotting emerging patterns, and they 
act as scientific ‘props’ for fictional expectations by elucidating key causal mechanisms. 
This is a perfect example of what William Hazlitt ([1805] 1998, 21) called ‘reasoning 
imagination’: models stress-test imaginaries for plausibility in the light of such knowl-
edge as we have about emerging patterns and stable constraints, and they help flesh out 
different possibilities. 
This brings us to a crucial point: just because the future is uncertain does not mean that 
you have no clue about the future. Being unable to calculate future probabilities objec-
tively does not mean that you are dependent on uninformed fantasies. Any situation is 
structured by past investments, institutions, and the structures of social networks which 
channel what can be reasonably expected. The key to success in uncertain markets is 
to use analytical techniques to provide you with an understanding of the situation and 
the multiple possibilities and factors impacting on outcomes. In this sense, imaginaries 
are informed and enable you to make better judgments of how to act when you cannot 
know for certain what the best course of action will be. 
8 MPIfG Discussion Paper 19/10
Think, for example, about macroeconomic forecasts. Such forecasts are notoriously un-
reliable at predicting the future with precision – with outcomes often well outside the 
statistical ranges covered by the predictions of almost all prestigious forecasters. But if 
forecasting is so unreliable, why do governments and firms spend millions on it? Part 
of the answer lies in the underappreciated role of the forecasting process as a diagnos-
tic tool for teasing out emerging patterns. As Werner Reichmann (2018) and Douglas 
Holmes (2018) argue in our book, the ‘foretalking’ and ‘conversation’ with a variety of 
economic actors that forecasters undertake while preparing their forecasts help identify 
emerging trends and new scenarios that would otherwise not have been considered. At 
the same time, their forecasts highlight causal mechanisms likely to be relevant even if 
the point forecasts are almost inevitably adrift. 
Forecasts also perform important social roles in conditions of uncertainty: first, they 
help coordinate your beliefs with others. When you operate in a complex and innova-
tive economic system, you are not only uncertain about the situation itself, you are also 
uncertain about the contingent expectations and beliefs of other actors. And it is this 
self-reinforcing uncertainty problem that makes it difficult to coordinate action. Here 
forecasts can help: they act as a reference point by creating shared expectations that al-
low you to act as if the future were knowable. Without working assumptions provided 
by shared forecasts, there would be very little investment. 
Perhaps the most important social role played by forecasts is to justify and legitimise 
decisions despite the uncertainty faced. Calculative technologies justify decisions by 
providing reasons for action and evidence of due diligence. This legitimising role of 
models and forecasts may be benign so long as their status as generators of informed 
imaginaries is remembered. But, if they are used to pretend that it is actually possible to 
turn uncertainty into measurable risk, then this pretence can pose a threat to stability. 
Modern managers and policymakers like using calculative technologies as props for de-
cision-making because they meet the requirements of what Michael Power (2007, 197) 
calls the ‘logic of auditability’, with its ‘cultural ideals of precision, proof and calcula-
bility’. But this institutional incentive for unwarranted precision can lead to the sort of 
‘scientism’ that Hayek ([1952] 2010, 80) warned about, where decision makers engage in 
a ‘slavish imitation of the method and language’ of the mechanical sciences and apply 
them in ways that are simply inappropriate for the indeterminate and complex socio-
economic subject matter of markets. The result is a dangerous illusion of control over 
the unknowable future. 
Take, for example, investment banks before the financial crisis, whose risk models indi-
cated that a crash of the sort seen after August 2008 would be something like a 25-stan-
dard deviation event (Haldane 2009); these models enabled the banks to act as if such 
an outcome was almost impossibly unlikely. And the problem runs deeper than that: 
the assumptions and modelling practices used constituted the very grammar or internal 
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logic for structured finance markets.7 As Donald MacKenzie (2006) puts it, a finance 
model is not so much a ‘camera’ recording current pointers to the future as an ‘engine’ 
structuring the future by creating the possibility of markets. In other words, the models 
used create market practices in their own image. Suffice it to say, when the models pro-
viding the internal logic for structured finance markets involve an underlying confu-
sion between measurable risk and the radical uncertainty implied by innovation, then 
these highly innovative markets may lead to uncontrollable volatility. As Elena Esposito 
(2018, 228, 233) argues in our book: ‘Like all fictions, financial models about the future 
are extremely controlled constructions’; but, since ‘they are not accurate representa-
tions of a future reality’, they can end up ‘reproducing’ the very uncertainty they claim 
to control.
4 Narratives
Fictional expectations are usually anchored in narratives and stories. Narratives help 
make sense of the world: they give meaning to your actions and create the commitment 
to act. Narratives convey an imagined future to others. They may take the form of new 
era stories, promised fortunes, or dystopias that must be avoided. They may be influen-
tial in their own right, or become embedded in the assumptions of algorithms or other 
calculative technologies. As Harro van Lente and Arie Rip (1998) from the Sociology 
of Expectations school demonstrate in empirical studies of innovation processes, nar-
ratives assign roles to actors and technological objects and develop a ‘plot’ – a storyline 
of how an imagined future may unfold. Stories motivate by delineating an emotionally 
charged vision of the future. They provide a road map that helps counter anxiety in the 
face of uncertainty by simulating possible outcomes and making them feel tangible. In 
short, narratives provide a logic of action and populate the future with imaginaries that 
seem worth investing in. Aptly, David Tuckett (2018) speaks, in our book, of ‘conviction 
narratives’. And since narratives, if internalised by sufficient numbers, tend to influence 
outcomes, they inevitably become instruments of political or market power. The future 
is shaped by political battles to establish the dominance of particular narratives. 
An economic example of these battles is the increasing use by central banks of ‘forward 
guidance’ to cajole expectations in the desired direction. As Douglas Holmes (2018, 174, 
178) argues in our volume, by communicating a picture of the future evolution of the 
economy, a central bank can enlist the public’s help in reaching macroeconomic targets 
with rhetoric alone. In this way, communication becomes the ‘decisive means to achieve’ 
the goals of policy; or, in the words of Ben Bernanke, the former governor of the US 
7 For a discussion of how certain ‘technical’ risk measurement practices (in particular cardinal 
measures of credit risk) enable ‘the creation of structured finance securities in the first place’, see 
Besedovsky (2018).
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Federal Reserve: ‘monetary policy is 98% talk and only 2% action’ (Bernanke 2015). 
Perhaps the most famous example of the power of central bank rhetoric was the enor-
mous market effectiveness of the simple statement by Mario Draghi in 2012 that the 
European Central Bank would do ‘whatever it takes’ to rescue the euro (Draghi 2012). 
These three words are generally credited with turning the corner in the euro crisis and 
bringing stability back to market expectations. The direction of capitalist economies 
then increasingly appears to be the outcome of a struggle between different state and 
market actors to establish their narratives as the most credible. 
Let us return to the crucial problem of managing expectations in innovative sectors of 
the economy. It is of course in radically innovative sectors that uncertainty about the 
future is most extreme, and yet it is precisely in these sectors that some stabilisation of 
expectations is required for investment to be made in new products or processes. If in-
novative ideas are to corner the resources needed to make them a reality, they require 
promissory stories that help coordinate investment. Such blueprints, technology road-
maps, and business plans are instruments of coordination in a field of multiple possible 
futures: they determine which development paths are followed and which remain un-
explored, thereby reducing the indeterminacy of the future. The Research and Develop-
ment trajectories of whole industries are often determined by competition to establish 
the dominance of one new era story over another. 
But herein lies a paradox: it is well understood that innovative ideas are the product of 
cognitive dissonance, the clash of competing narratives, and constant trial and error. 
Any innovator must avoid becoming locked into one way of analysing problems and be 
willing to engage in constant ‘narrative shifting’ (Lane and Maxfield 2005, 16) to make 
sense of fast changing trends. So, there is a trade-off here between the advantages of 
shared expectations and the dangers of an analytical monoculture that leads to widely 
shared cognitive blind spots and a consequent failure to spot new trends or opportuni-
ties.8 Indeed, throughout policy and business, there is a trade-off between the positive 
coordination effects of stabilising and homogenising expectations to reduce uncertainty 
(on the one hand) and the value of retaining a diversity of expectation-guiding models 
and narratives – the better to cope with uncertainty (on the other). Perhaps this is the 
central conundrum of modern life. Do we attempt to reduce uncertainty by choosing 
one dominant narrative or calculative technology in the hope of building a world in its 
image? Or do we navigate and exploit uncertainty better by remaining flexible in how 
we envisage the unfolding future? 
8 See the discussion of this trade-off in innovative industries in Ergen (2018). 
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5 The dangers of analytical monocultures
To help answer this, it is worth exploring further the danger of ‘analytical monocul-
tures’ (Bronk 2013). It is a truism of post-Kantian thought that the world you see – the 
evidence you collate – is partly constructed by the conceptual grids your mind sup-
plies. In other words, the facts or data you use are necessarily framed and selected by 
the theories and narratives you internalise. And because all narratives and models are 
incomplete – they are simplifications9 – if everyone relies on one and the same story or 
model, everyone tends to share the same analytical blind spots. 
At least since Wittgenstein ([1953] 2001) and Bourdieu ([1972] 1977), it has also been 
understood that these semi-conscious mental maps are embedded in habitual social 
and technological practices – that our shared practices and the conceptual structures 
framing our analysis and vision are mutually constituted. As Wade Jacoby and Richard 
Bronk argue in a paper, this makes it crucial for businesses, regulators, and academic 
researchers to avoid being trapped in analytical monocultures implied by the discourse 
of best practice (Bronk and Jacoby 2016). In conditions of uncertainty, you cannot know 
what the best practice will be, and any set of practices entails blind spots. Total harmoni-
sation of practice around the ‘best’ model available is equivalent to relying in agricul-
ture on a single crop strain when you do not know whether the chosen strain will be 
resistant to the next new pest. If everyone shares the same policy practice or calculative 
technology and thereby internalises the same framing assumptions and conceptual grid, 
they interpret events in the same way and share the same cognitive blind spots. 
One cause of the financial crisis, for example, was that the major banks and regulators 
fell under the spell of what Michael Power (2007, viii) calls the ‘grand narrative of risk 
management’ promising an illusion of control over the unknowable future. In particular, 
they relied in everyday practice on a type of value-at-risk model that assumed uncertainty 
could be turned into probabilistic risk. When this shared assumption proved deeply mis-
taken, nearly everyone in the market was wrong-footed at the same time. The result was 
a highly correlated correction to market prices – in other words, a crash. More generally, 
as Robert Boyer (2018) argues in our book, modern financial markets and global capi-
talism – precisely because they are prone to uncertainty – tend to converge on a series 
of beguiling grand narratives that each serves for a time to coordinate investment and 
increase confidence. But when each one in turn is found wanting, the consequent shift to 
a new grand narrative is associated with a rapid reset of expectations and market prices. 
Indeed, the only antidote to such destabilising market dislocations caused by ‘groupthink’ 
– or ‘groupfeel’ (Tuckett 2018, 76) – may be to encourage a greater pluralism in narratives, 
models, and institutional regimes, and to refrain from privileging regulatory harmoni-
sation around best practice as a policy goal. Markets are more stable when driven by a 
diverse range of practices and associated structuring assumptions.
9 As Peter Diamond (2011, 1045–46) puts it, ‘It is worth remembering that models are incomplete 
– indeed, that is what it means to be a model’.
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6 Re-imagining economics
This has implications for the discipline of applied economics. It suggests the need for 
‘disciplined eclecticism’, where the choice of model is driven by a ‘pre-analytical audit’ of 
the problem being analysed from multiple perspectives; and where research results are 
subject to a ‘post-analytical audit’ by those in different disciplines using diverse models 
(Bronk 2009, 276–87). In other words, researchers and policymakers must combine the 
conviction necessary for analysis or action with what the poet John Keats ([1817] 1998, 
1019) calls ‘negative capability’ – the capacity to be in ‘uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, 
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason’. You can only spot emerging pat-
terns and create new solutions if you are receptive to new pointers and flexible in how 
you see the world. 
More generally, economists and policymakers need to interpret the contingent and 
diverse ways in which economic actors visualise and imagine uncertain futures. This 
puts a premium on what the co-founder of the LSE Beatrice Webb ([1883] 1958) called 
‘analytical imagination’ – the ability to project yourself into the contingent mindset of 
others and understand how they see the world. At a discipline level, it also implies the 
need for rigorous discourse analysis of the narratives motivating actors in indeterminate 
circumstances; such discourse analysis forms a key part of our approach. 
Another facet of our approach that differs from standard economics mirrors Sheila Ja-
sanoff ’s emphasis on the scrambling together of micro and macro (Jasanoff 2004). In one 
sense, our book provides an alternative set of micro-foundations for economics – with 
agents combining rational calculation with imaginaries. But the fictional expectations 
motivating individual behaviour are heavily dependent on social narratives and shared 
scripts at the macro level. The indeterminacy of economic futures is partially constrained 
by this social construction of expectations, but it is not eliminated. Indeed, social struc-
tures and framing narratives are frequently re-interpreted by narrative-entrepreneurs 
intent on re-imagining the future and convincing others of their novel visions. 
One response to our explanatory focus on contingent imaginaries and narratives is to 
wonder if they are epiphenomenal – or essentially superfluous – to a standard economics 
focus on interests or a political science focus on power. If the narratives and imaginaries 
that count and help perform the future are sorted according to dominant interests, or if 
their salience is a function of market or political power, does an analytical focus on them 
change as much as we claim? Our answer is that the very interests that actors pursue 
are constituted by how they imagine the future; their interests are defined by the shared 
imaginaries through which they make sense of their predicament. So, for example, Jenny 
Andersson (2018, 85) demonstrates in our book how the interests that states pursue in 
the Arctic are formed through ‘a repertoire of future-making’ including forecasts, nar-
ratives, and normative images. Likewise, power is increasingly a function of the ability 
to craft narratives or public images that engage citizens’ imaginations. In both cases, the 
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determining factors – interests and power – are contingent creations of how we individu-
ally and collectively imagine, or are coerced into imagining, the uncertain future.
7 The politics of uncertain futures
Our argument has focused on how economic actors make decisions despite radical un-
certainty and the implications for policy and the science of economics. But let us turn 
briefly to the political significance of the argument. When the future is indeterminate 
and the expectations motivating behaviour cannot be anchored in some pre-existing fu-
ture reality, expectations have an important role in creating the future. In this sense, there 
is something inherently political about economies built on fictional expectations: the 
choice of which imaginaries, stories, or calculative devices structure beliefs and behav-
iour becomes a legitimate object of political challenge and debate. And it goes without 
saying that there is an unequal distribution of the market, political, or rhetorical power 
to ensure that any particular imaginary, narrative, or calculative technology counts. 
The analogies with the world of contemporary politics are clear: at a time of economic 
uncertainty and social turmoil, voters’ expectations are also cast adrift from their tradi-
tional or socially embedded moorings. In this environment, political power rests with 
those able to fashion and disseminate simple narratives promising to banish insecuri-
ties and build an appealing future. Indeed, at times politics seems reduced to a battle of 
warring narratives – where nostalgic visions of ‘taking back control’ or ‘making Amer-
ica great again’ trump careful analysis, or where dystopian visions of chaos caused by 
immigration change the course of history. This makes it imperative for political systems 
to rediscover ways in which different visions of the future can be calmly debated, and 
trade-offs between different normative goals can be made in the light of known facts or 
environmental constraints. 
Let us end with four pointers to why this task may be challenging in our uncertain times:
First, political systems rely as much on their ‘promissory legitimacy’ as on their estab-
lished success (Beckert 2019). In particular, many of the changes implied by the neo-
liberal economic agenda have relied for their legitimacy on the promise – the imagi-
nary – of greater prosperity and liberty for all in the wake of increased liberalisation, 
deregulation, and globalisation. When this imaginary was crushed in the eyes of many 
by the financial crisis and years of median-wage stagnation, voters became increasingly 
disillusioned with the blueprints being advocated by those in authority.
Secondly, one of the inherent promises of capitalist systems is that the uncertainty 
implied by Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ – or Ulrich Beck’s ‘whirlpool of change’ 
(Beck 1992) – is merely the unwelcome flipside of a cherished freedom to choose among 
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newly imagined options and transcend the shackles of the past. But the benefits of this 
freedom to innovate and create new worlds increasingly seem to accrue largely to an 
elite, while the costs of associated rapid social dislocation fall most heavily on those 
with few educational or financial resources.
Thirdly, uncertain futures call for expert judgement to tease out ambiguous pointers to 
emerging trends and compare the findings of diverse models. But our uncertain times 
have weakened the credibility of experts especially where they have made forecasts of 
unwarranted precision. And, sometimes even where their analysis and judgement were 
flawless, they are accused of crying wolf, because their scary pre-mortems of possible 
disasters ahead ensured that action was taken in time to avoid the outcome feared. This 
was the case when the ozone hole was mended by the precautionary outlawing of CFCs.
Finally, there is a paradox in much political action designed to avert negative scenarios 
and assuage voter anxiety. Like all innovation, new policy solutions break predictable 
links between past and future and have unforeseen and indeterminate consequences. 
However much we seek to limit the impact of uncertainty – or pretend it does not exist – 
it is an unavoidable feature of modernity.
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